the paradox comes when one tries to then categorize this exteriority as Sameness, for the Same can only be defined in distinction to difference, which differentiation is a mechanism of cognition; exteriority itself can't be recognized as a category either in this sense, making that or any other term for it untenable. but one has to say something. what one gets is some sort of consistency that is at one time wholly other to thought and that upon which thought depends: a kind of vulnerability to cognition without any sort of native categorical presence. or absence. no "presence in absence" but an impossibility of either: the scrambling of proximity and distance.
the same thing happens when you try to name this moment/region/event as universal truth, because it must be thought outside of the distinction between true and false as well; rather it is something like the question which asks "true or false?": the possibility of there being either.
I do not know if one could say this quality is irreparable, in the way Agamben means it, because it is unthinkable, but there is something poignant in its impotence when it comes to language and conceptual presence, its absolute vulnerability to erasure underneath categorical thought itself.
is "attachment" another word for propriety and subjective acquisitiveness? I read of hints of ownership and possessiveness and when I think of that which shatters this possessiveness, it turns out to be something other to the subject's ability to cognize itself and its borders, and somthing that calls into question whether or not the subject can distinguish itself from that which appears to be exterior to it. this "something" would not be a thing but this very consistency wherein cognitive categories become indistinguishable but not identical, not "the same."
anyway I'm wondering what the zen people will say if I start talking about this stuff at one of their workshops. don't mind me. I'm just trying to get it straight. tomorrow I'm going to try to say the same thing using more verbs.